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Edible Equivalents: An Increase in Patent Protection 
for Genetically Modified Organisms 
Alexis Gorton∗ 
GET OUT YOUR FORKS: THE ISSUE IS SERVED 
At the close of the nineteenth century, the head of the Patent & 
Trademark Office exclaimed that everything conceivable had already 
been invented and that it was only logical for his agency to close.1 As 
we enter the new millennium, though, members of the scientific and 
legal communities can reflect upon a century of incredible innovation 
in technology and the institutions related to its creation and control. 
Unfortunately, the law has been playing catch-up with industrial and 
academic advances.2 As a consequence, there are instances where the 
inadequacies of the current legal framework impede technological 
development. One such area is the protection of intellectual property3 
relating to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
 
 ∗  J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2002. 
 1. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE ix (1999). This oft 
quoted remark of Charles H. Duell was made in response to the explosion of innovation that 
occurred in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The administrator’s exasperation is quite 
understandable in light of the flood of new patent applications related to transportation and 
communication which radically and quickly changed the lives of human beings. Id. 
 2. See, e.g., Ellis, infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 3. “‘[I]ntellectual property law’ is merely a convenient umbrella term to describe certain 
intangible products of creativity that society has deemed worthy of protection . . . [in the form 
of] trademarks, copyrights, patents, trade secrets, and the right of publicity.” KENNETH L. PORT 
ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (1999). Many of the same rights that apply to 
real property also apply to some forms of intellectual property including the right to occupy, 
use, exclude, and transfer. GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 240 (2d ed. 1994). Chisum and Jacobs 
have generally described intellectual property law as “concerned with fostering human 
creativity without unduly restricting dissemination of its fruits.” DONALD S. CHISUM & 
MICHAEL A. JACOBS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDEBOOK: UNITED STATES § 1A 
(1992). “Today more than ever before, the products of the mind—aesthetic, technological, and 
organizational—are humankind’s most valuable assets.” Id. § 1B. 
321 
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Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals4 have experienced a great deal of difficulty in applying the 
old doctrines of infringement litigation to the novel issues created by 
patenting biotechnology.5 While panels at the appellate level waffle, 
district court dockets are flooded with infringement disputes, and 
district court judges are left with few usable guidelines to resolve 
these disputes effectively.6 It is imperative, therefore, that the courts 
adopt a clear and readily applicable framework of analysis to handle 
the increase in litigation that is likely to result as scientists continue 
to build upon the patentable work of others.7 Uniformity in 
infringement judgments will be impossible without such a 
framework.8 This, in turn, will create a lack of predictability for those 
 
 4. While patent cases may be brought in any federal district court with jurisdiction, 
appeals are not heard in the eleven regional circuits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1999) (district 
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents”). Rather, all patent appeals are heard at the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals sitting in Washington, D.C. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1999). The “lack of uniform 
application of the patent law by various regional Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the need to 
improve the stability of patent law spawned the creation of this court.” John B. Pegram, Should 
There be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 770 (2000). The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals also has 
appellate jurisdiction over “government claims, international trade, and taxes.” Id. at 771. 
 5. The United States is not unique in its struggle with these emerging issues. “European 
patent law concerning genetically modified organisms is in a mess, and needs to be completely 
rethought to balance the commercial, ethical and scientific aspects of this difficult question.” 
John R. Porter, Patent Confusion in Law on New Plant Varieties, 404 NATURE 13, 13 (2000). 
Porter and others have called for an “open consensus conference on patenting living things, 
organized by the EPO [European Patent Office], as the basis for an equitable European way out 
of the quagmire of patents for genetically modified organisms.” Id; see, e.g., Directive 
98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213 13-
21). 
 6. Approximately forty percent of trial court patent decisions are overruled at the 
appellate level, thus greatly diminishing the uniformity and finality values of the district court 
proceedings. See Laurence H. Pretty, The Judicial Attack on Infringement, in PATENT 
LITIGATION 245, 251-52 (1999). Moreover, the problem is compounded by district court 
judges’ sporadic exposure to patent cases, which renders them unable to gain expertise in the 
application of the law in this practice area. Pegram, supra note 4, at 788-89. 
 7. “The very patentability of genetically engineered life forms is increasing patent 
activity, even amongst those opposed to the principle of patenting.” Ruth McNally & Peter 
Wheale, The Consequences of Modern Genetic Engineering: Patents, ‘Nomads’ and the ‘Bio-
Industrial Complex,’ in THE SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 317 (Peter 
Wheale et al. eds., 1998). 
 8. Patent law is “unique in that its primary, if not exclusive, objective is to motivate 
future behavior,” but this goal cannot be met without “some degree of [confidence] of what the 
law will be across the nation.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
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seeking to develop and protect GMOs.9 Such a void will likely 
decrease investment in research and development, which in turn will 
cripple innovation and eradicate the benefits that society reaps from 
it.10 
To address these issues, this Note proposes a new legal framework 
for the comparison of patented and accused devices11 in GMO patent 
infringement litigation. Part I provides a primer on the development 
of genetically modified organisms and their place in science and 
society. Part II lays out a brief synopsis of patent law and focuses on 
infringement litigation and the current application of the doctrine of 
equivalents in the context of infringement litigation. Part III 
addresses the inadequacies of the current decision making calculus 
and summarizes a variety of solutions proposed to remedy this 
deficiency. Lastly, Part IV critiques those proposals and offers a new 
test of comparison to reform patent infringement litigation for GMOs.  
I. GMOS AND THEIR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. Definition and Development of GMOs 
Professor John Ellis once stated that we are now in the “Third 
Industrial Revolution,”12 in which humans can construct organisms to 
 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (1989). 
 9. See Pegram, supra note 4, at 790 (noting that with an increase in predictability comes 
a decrease in litigation, as people avoid acts of infringement and parties are more likely to enter 
into settlement negotiations).  
 10. This represents the bargain theory of patent protection, which asserts that “people will 
be encouraged to produce new inventions if there is some reward as an incentive.” DURHAM, 
supra note 1, at 14; see also infra note 34 and accompanying text. But see Andrew Pollack, U.S. 
Hopes to Stem Rush Toward Patenting of Genes, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/062800sci-genome-patents.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2002) (noting that patenting may lead to a decease in innovation as companies must 
conduct time-consuming searches through the “minefield” of existing claims). Cf. McNally & 
Wheale, supra note 7, at 317-18 (claiming that the innovation theory should not be applied to 
patent law where the creation of monopolies acts as a disincentive to research and development 
by decreasing the realm of available information to claim and build upon). 
 11. The alleged infringing entity is referred to as the “accused device.” See, e.g., ARTHUR 
R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 128 (3d ed. 2000).  
 12. John Ellis, Why Is Genetic Engineering Important and How Has It Come About?, in 
UNDERSTANDING GENETIC ENGINEERING 9 (J.C. Murrell & L.M. Roberts eds., 1989). Ellis 
notes that the first industrial revolution “arose from the application of new sources of energy to 
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perform specific societal functions.13 These GMOs are created by 
introducing foreign genetic material into the cells of a naturally 
occurring life form. The insertion takes place at a sufficiently early 
stage in a cell’s development, such that when the organism matures, 
all of its cells contain the introduced genetic material. 14  
Such genetic modifications are only the latest chapter in the age-
old tale of human manipulation of plants and animals.15 
Domestication, “the process whereby human management brings 
morphological changes in plants or animals,” is likely to have begun 
by 12,000 B.C. 16 In its most simple form, domestication involves “the 
propagation of those plants that yield the most, the largest, or the best 
in the breeder’s judgment.”17 The first and longest period of 
manipulation commenced as nomadic humans began to settle and 
 
the mass production of goods,” and the second from “the extension of information theory to 
industrial processes.” Id. Just as the GMO controversy has and will continue to alter the way 
humans live, these first two revolutions “produced huge sociopolitical upheavals with 
concomitant changes in legal practice.” Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. U.S. Patent No. 4,405,829 (issued Apr. 12, 1988) (transgenic non-human mammals), 
reprinted in MILESTONES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CLASSIC PAPERS ON GENETIC ENGINEERING 
556, 559 (Julian Davies & William S. Reznikoff eds., 1992) (“Transgenic animals carry a gene 
which has been introduced into the germline of the animal, or ancestor of the animal, at an early 
(usually one-cell) developmental stage.”). For a more technical description of this process, see 
Lisa A. Karczewski, Comment, Biotechnological Gene Patent Applications: The Implications 
of the USPTO Written Description Requirement Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1048-51 (2000); Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the 
Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of 
Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1236-39 (2000). This technique is distinct from 
gene therapy, in which foreign genetic material is inserted into the cells of an organism after 
development, namely to treat disease. The medical community and the public, however, have 
greatly scrutinized gene therapy. Interest has heightened since the death of a woman during a 
1999 clinical gene therapy trial. See Gretchen Vogel, FDA Moves Against Penn Scientist, 290 
SCIENCE 2049, 2049 (2000). Since that incident, the FDA has proposed several rules to increase 
the oversight of clinical trials. See FDA Proposes More Open Gene Therapy Rules, REUTERS 
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 17, 2001 (on file with author). 
 15. “Humans have been manipulating the genetic make up of plants (and animals) for 
millennia.” Crispin B. Taylor, Factories of the Future? Metabolic Engineering in Plant Cells, 
10 THE PLANT CELL 641, 641 (1998). Only the pace of that manipulation has recently 
increased. Id. 
 16. DANIEL E. VASEY, AN ECOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE: 10,000 B.C.—A.D. 
10,000 26 (1992). Morphological changes in plants, an indication of domestication, may have 
been present as early as 8500 B.C. Id. Some scholars make the case for cultivation at 12,000 B.C. 
Id. Primary dependence on domesticated plants and animals dates between 8000 to 4000 B.C. 
Id.  
 17. Id. at 27. 
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domesticate plants by collecting seeds from the most robust and 
productive individual plants to sow in subsequent seasons.18 In the 
twentieth century, the second phase began when farmers started to 
deliberately select and sell seeds of improved quality for output and 
resistance to disease, pests, and drought.19 Farmers also followed 
similar practices to breeding animals during these first two periods.20  
Approximately thirty years ago, the third stage of management 
began with the advent of genetic engineering, a cumulative result of 
advances in biochemistry, molecular biology, and genetics.21 
Laboratories moved beyond manipulating isolated DNA in test tubes, 
to cloning genetic material from cells, and finally to inserting foreign 
DNA into organisms to create GMOs.22 Today, these “transgenic” 
organisms include a variety of viruses, microbial organisms, plants, 
and animals.23 Additionally, many of these organisms have extensive 
commercial applications in agriculture, medicine, and industrial 
material manufacturing.24 
 
 18. Maarten Koornneef & Piet Stam, Changing Paradigms in Plant Breeding, 125 PLANT 
PHYSIOLOGY 156, 156 (2001). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Taylor, supra note 15, at 641. Thus, almost all foods in the human diet were 
“genetically modified” before the advent of GM technology. See J. Howard Beales III, 
Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Biotechnology and the Regulation of 
Information, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 106 (2000). 
 21. Robert B. Goldberg, From Cot Curves to Genomics: How Gene Cloning Established 
New Concepts in Plant Biology, 125 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 4, 4-5 (2001). Goldberg also notes 
that basic genetic engineering was as controversial at its inception as genetically modified 
organisms are today. Id. 
 22. See generally Koornneef & Stam, supra note 18; Goldberg, supra note 21. See also 
Steven H. Yoshida, The Safety of Genetically Modified Soybeans: Evidence and Regulation, 55 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 193 (2000) (“Unlike selective breeding[,] . . . transgenic technology allows 
for the selection of individual genes from one species, their transfer to another species, and 
control over the expression … within the new host.”). 
 23. Beales, supra note 20, at 107. Beales separates GMOs into three categories. First, 
there are those with input traits that add a valuable characteristic, such as disease resistance, to 
aid the producer. Id. Second, there is a group of organisms with quality traits that are materially 
altered in a way that affects the consumer or user. Id. For example, rice may be altered to have 
an increased level of Vitamin A to promote human health. Lastly, “biofactories” are organisms 
altered to generate a foreign product, such as a bacteria modified to produce synthetic enzymes 
used in cheese processing. Id. 
 24. For example, a jellyfish luminescence gene has been inserted into potatoes so that it 
will glow in times of water stress. See New Super-Spud Glows to Ask for Water, REUTERS 
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 18, 2000. The modified potato will act as a marker for unmodified potatoes 
growing in the same area. Id. When the plant experiences water stress, the fluorescence gene 
will cause its leaves to glow, thus signaling that the entire area is in need of irrigation. Id. Pigs 
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B. The GMO Problem 
Scientific progress in genetic research has not enjoyed universal 
acceptance from either the research community or the public at 
large.25 From an intellectual standpoint, genetic information resists 
control because it exists within every living being and will continue 
to do so regardless of the institutions created to deal with the legal 
repercussions of its manipulation. 26 On a less esoteric plane, there 
 
are now engineered to produce human blood-clotting factors in their milk. Thomas Train Moga, 
Transgenic Animals as Intellectual Property, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 511, 530 
(1994). The Roslin Institute is developing a method to produce similar drugs in the eggs of 
chickens. Dolly Creators to Make GM Chickens to Fight Cancer, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Dec. 6, 
2000. Scientists expect that eggs will be less expensive and more expedient than milk. Id. They 
also cite the advantages of a “virtually unlimited production process through laying eggs.” Id.  
Scientists are also strengthening plant fibers for industrial utilization to reduce the use of, and 
reliance on, those currently produced from petroleum products. See Chris R. Sommerville & 
Dario Bonetta, Plants as Factories for Technical Materials, 125 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 168, 168-
69 (2001). These products include modified starches, oils, fibers, and polymers. Id. at 169-70. 
Using plant materials as substitutes for synthetics produced from fossil fuels may result in 
“more sustainable and environmentally benign” industrial practices and preserve petroleum 
resources. Id. at 168. Cf. Taylor, supra note 15, at 641 (focusing on the manipulation of 
metabolic pathways to produce commercially useful products). 
 25. Perhaps the greatest outcry surrounding genetic engineering has been in response to 
the development of cloning and its possible extension to human applications. In particular, the 
focus is on cloning related to, but distinct from, genetic engineering and therapy. In cloning, 
rather than inserting foreign DNA into another organism, scientists use the original DNA to 
clone an exact replica of the original organism. While scientists have cloned viruses and micro-
organisms for decades, their use of the technique in plants and animals is a fairly recent 
phenomenon. See generally Mark Jagels, Note, Dr. Moreau Has Left the Island: Dealing with 
Human-Animal Patents in the 21st Century, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 115 (2000) (describing 
cloning and a recent patent application for human-animal chimeras); Scientists Clone 
Endangered Guar But It Dies, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Jan. 12, 2001; Texas Bull Cloned for 
Disease Resistance, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Dec. 18, 2000. For recent developments in cloning 
technology, see Elizabeth Pennisi, After Dolly, a Pharming Frenzy, 279 SCIENCE 646 (1998); 
A.W.S Chan et al., Transgenic Monkeys Produced by Retroviral Gene Transfer into Mature 
Oocytes, 291 SCIENCE 309 (2001). In contrast to the American situation, other nations have 
clamored over genetically modified food, but are seemingly more receptive to human cloning. 
See, e.g., Britain Gives Green Light for Embryo Cloning, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Jan. 22, 2001; 
Italian, U.S. Scientists Unveil Human Cloning Effort, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Jan. 26, 2001. 
 26. According to molecular biologist Jonathan King, “the notion that some company has a 
monopoly on my genes is like claiming ownership of the air.” Pollack, supra note 10. Cf. Lee 
M. Silver, The Meaning of Genes and “Genetic Rights,” 40 JURIMETRICS J. 9 (1999).  
Furthermore, “[s]cientific inquiry thrives only in a society that fosters the free flow of ideas and 
information.” Natasha V. Raikhel et al., The Free Flow of Ideas, Information, and Materials, 12 
PLANT CELL 2297 (2000). The notion that information exists independently in nature 
contradicts the natural rights theory of patent protection which emphasizes that the “product of 
mental labor is by right the property of the person who created it.” DURHAM, supra note 1, at 
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has been an explosion of public concern, both in the United States27 
and abroad,28 regarding genetic modifications, most notably with 
respect to ethical29 and environmental issues.30 Despite such 
 
15; see also infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 27. As a result, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has proposed regulations to 
govern genetically modified food, which now occupies two-thirds of the U.S. processed food 
market. See Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Plans New Scrutiny in Areas of Biotechnology, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at A12; see also Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 
Fed. Reg. 4706 (2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592) (proposed Jan. 18, 2001). For 
an example of an American protest, see Bioengineering Action Network, Militants Splice 
Animal Geneticists in Twin Cities, 20 EARTHFIRST J. ¶ 11-14 (Oct. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.earthfirstjournal.org/feature.cfm?ID=56.html, which describes a protest against a 
meeting of the International Society for Animal Genetics at which over eighty people were 
arrested in two days. The protest was based on the belief that GMOs are another example of 
animals having “no worth to scientists, corporations, or universities, beyond their economic 
use” due to the “extreme disregard for the role of non-human animals in the interdependent web 
of life.” Id. ¶ 11-12. 
 28. For example, twenty-eight members of Greenpeace were acquitted on criminal 
charges in England for protesting the “genetic contamination of the environment.” Press 
Release, Greenpeace, Greenpeace Volunteers Acquitted in GM Trial (Sept. 20, 2000) (on file 
with author). Specifically, the members attacked a genetically modified corn crop by cutting the 
stalks and sealing the corn in bags. Id. In contrast, Italy has placed severe restrictions on GMO 
research, and in response, has received harsh criticism from the scientific community. Lone 
Frank, Italian Scientists Blast GMO Restrictions, 290 SCIENCE 2046 (2000). 
 29. Those claiming moral outrage at the patenting of living things “argue that a gene is 
not an invention, but something that exists in nature, which should be the common heritage of 
mankind.” Pollack, supra note 10. This claim begs the question: if genetic information is part of 
the common heritage, is it res communis, common property to be shared and protected by all, or 
res nullis, the property of no one to be exploited by all who have the ability to do so? As the 
inevitability of GMO development becomes more apparent, the debate is likely to shift to a 
reevaluation of the release of modified organisms into the wild and of the relationship in 
technology transfer between nations. See Baruch Brody, On Patenting Transgenic Animals, AG 
BIOETHICS FORUM 7 (Nov. 1995), reprinted in GENETIC ENGINEERING: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 56, 60 (Thomas A. Shannon ed., 1999). For a discussion of GMOs and the 
asymmetrical power structure that allows developed nations to exploit them, see KRISHNA R. 
DRONAMRAJU, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY SHARING (1999) 
(addressing international, social, and environmental issues related to biotech sharing); see also 
Julian Kinderlerer, Genetically Modified Organisms: A European Scientist’s View, 8 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 556, 565 (2000) (noting that the acceptance of genetically modified foods in 
developed nations may be critical to their credibility in the developing world which desperately 
needs new ways to utilize limited agricultural resources). 
 
 30. For the most comprehensive analysis of studies related to the GMOs in the 
environment, see L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and Benefits of 
Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 SCIENCE 2008 (2000). Wolfenbarger and Phifer reviewed 
published studies of GMOs in the wild and concluded that “neither the risks nor benefits of 
[GMOs] are certain or universal,” but they “may vary spatially and temporally on a case-by-
case basis.” Id. at 2092. Furthermore, the authors found prospective risk assessment highly 
unreliable due to an uncertain deficiency of environmental impact assessment data. Id. Many in 
the scientific community believe that GMO research should continue until there is conclusive 
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resistance, scientists around the world have manipulated genetic 
information for more than a generation, and will continue to do so.31 
It is imperative, therefore, for the legal community to focus on fitting 
the products of this research into the normative structure of society,32 
 
proof that it is dangerous, but others find support in the study’s findings for the need to cut back 
on GMO research until more definite conclusions have been reached. Carol K. Yoon, Gene-
Altered Crop Studies Are Called Inconclusive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A22. See 
generally Les Levidow & Susan Carr, Normalizing Novelty: Regulating Biotechnological Risk 
at the U.S. EPA, 11 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 9 (2000) (describing EPA regulation of 
GMOs). For an international assessment of these issues, see Lyle Glowka, Bioprospecting, 
Alien Invasion Species, and Hydothermal Vents: Three Emerging Legal Issues in the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L. REV. 329 (1999). 
Interestingly, another view notes that “concerns about transgenics are virtually absent in the 
area of medical applications.” Koornneef & Stam, supra note 18, at 157. George B. Rathman, 
the first chief executive of Amgen, Inc., the nation’s largest biotechnical company, believes that 
the difference in the need for agricultural applications is not as obvious to the public as “saving 
your mother’s life, which is what biopharmaceuticals have done.” Instead, the benefits of 
agricultural applications must “trickle-down” to the public from the farmer in the form of better 
products and lower prices. Andrew Pollack, An Industry Patriarch at the Forefront as 
Genomics Science Comes of Age, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at C3. 
 31. See generally Goldberg, supra note 21. In fact, nearly 2.5 billion people worldwide 
are already having intimate contact with GMOs, most notably in the food that they eat. 
Henrique Friere de Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need for International Regulation, 6 
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 140 (2000). 
 32. See Marco Ricolfi, Bioethics Markets and Morals: The Case of Biotechnological 
Patents, in A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BIOETHICS 131, 132 (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., 
1998) (noting that there must be “a tradeoff between ultimate goals (values; moral perspectives) 
. . . and a different innovation . . . , which surely is of paramount importance for our societies 
but clearly is subordinate, in that allocative efficiency belongs to the realm of means and not of 
ends”). There is concern that widespread use of genetically modified foods will lead to further 
degradation of rural life, upon which much of American culture evolved. “[Genetically 
modified] crops and related technologies are likely to consolidate control over agriculture by 
large producers and agro-industry, to the detriment of smaller farmers.” Biotech Sees Riches in 
Weed’s Genetic Secrets, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 2000. Cf. Jon Lauck, After 
Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of ‘Freedom to Farm, 5 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 3 (2000) (addressing a variety of problems associated with farming, legislation, and 
technology in the second half of the twentieth century including the extension of usurious loans 
to small farmers by conglomerates, which, at times, resulted in conditions amounting to 
“poultry peonage”); Paul S. Naik, Biotechnology Through the Eyes of An Opponent: The 
Resistance of Activist Jeremy Rifkin, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2000) (listing the dangers on 
increasing protection for GMO and the need to balance the promotion of innovation with the 
protection of society and the environment). But see Jeremy P. Oczek, Note, In the Aftermath of 
the “Terminator Technology” Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically 
Engineered Seeds and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REV. 627 (2000) (arguing 
that farmers should not get the benefit of seed technology without having to provide the creator 
with just compensation). Oczek goes on to say that “terminator” genes allow companies to 
ensure that they will be paid yearly for the use of their technology. For a more general 
discussion of these issues, see ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
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and to develop new principles to deal with their entry into the 
competitive economy. 33  
II. PATENTS, INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION, AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
EQUIVALENTS 
A. Patent Law Primer 
1. Legal Basis 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”34 Congress used this authority to create a 
system that encourages risk-based investment35 within our 
 
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998). 
 33. In the first modern case concerning the patenting of a living organism, the Supreme 
Court noted that “[t]he grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end 
to genetic research or its attendant risks,” but “whether respondent’s claims are patentable may 
determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of 
incentives.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). Likewise, the same logic 
applies to the outcome of infringement litigation, as both concerns turn on the predictability of 
return at the time of investment. Thus, the central question, when applying for a patent, is 
whether the government will reward the applicant’s investigation with a patent. In contrast, 
when the holder of a patent anticipates litigation, the question becomes whether the patent will 
protect the patentee from infringement by competitors.  
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The courts purposely construe this clause broadly. See 
FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM 180 (1925) (noting that the Patent 
Clause has been “bent to purposes and facilitated results never intended or expected by the 
framers of the constitution or the patent statues”) After all, the clause contemplates nothing 
more than innovation and advancement, and assumes that the government should act to further 
these goals. For a discussion of fitting recent scientific tools within the purview of the 
Constitution, see IRA H. CARMEN, CLONING AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO 
GOVERNMENTAL POLICYMAKING AND GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION (1985). Interestingly, 
inventors did have property rights at common law, but those rights were ill-defined and could 
not provide the requisite stability needed for large scale innovation. FRANK E. ROBBINS, THE 
DEFENSE OF PRIOR INVENTION: PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 207 (1977) (citing F. 
Gabrell, The Constitution and the In Personam Defense of First Invention, 39 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 791, 802-08 (1957)).   
 35. Such investments spur innovation, which both requires and creates jobs, goods, and 
trade benefits. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 6 (1988) (citing 
Locite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Patlex Corp. v. Mossingkoff, 758 
F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Harmon argues that the patent system creates a “negative incentive 
to design around” a patented product because of the wide scope of the monopoly. This breadth 
ensures a “steady flow of innovations to the marketplace” as competitors try to improve on one 
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competitive economy.36 In short, the patenting of an invention creates 
a monopoly37 in the invention by giving the patentee the powerful 
right to exclude all others38 from using the invention except in those 
instances where the patentee chooses to transfer her rights through a 
sale or to exploit those rights through a licensing agreement.39  
 
another’s products and find their own product niche. Id. (citing State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith 
Corp., 751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that such innovation should not be hampered by 
giving patentees the right to punitive damages)). For a general discussion of the interplay 
between the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and patent law, see PETER A. ALCES & 
HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1994). 
 36. See HARMON, supra note 35, at 6. Note that the express purpose of granting greater 
property rights to patentees than to other owners of intellectual property is to encourage 
invention, and to thereby benefit the development of science and technology. See Kenneth L. 
Port, Foreword: Symposium on Intellectual Property Law, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 585, 590-94 
(1993), reprinted in KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 16 (1999). 
Port describes the incentive theory of patents, which holds that patentees are encouraged to 
create innovative inventions as a monopoly guarantees them the sole claim to any profits 
derived from those inventions. Id. While this theory satisfies the economic analysis of patent 
rights, it does not counteract the concern discussed in the introduction of this Note which states 
that information resists control. Port’s second justification for the patent monopoly stems from 
a natural rights argument grounded in this vein: “an inventor should own title to the creations of 
his/her mind.” Id. While the creator can always claim ownership within the realm of ideas, she 
must have some way of enforcing those property rights against others. The statutory scheme 
and patent system fill this void. In a reflection on these concepts, Rines concluded, “[t]he 
American patent system needs no apologists.” ROBERT H. RINES, CREATE OR PERISH: THE 
CASE FOR INVENTIONS AND PATENTS 1 (1925). Furthermore, “[c]reativity and any obstacles to 
it that exist or are put in its path are the concern of every person in the United States, and apply 
to every section of society and to every field of endeavor.” Id. at 145. 
 37. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (West 1984). The monopoly exists for twenty years from the date 
of application. In certain situations, this enforcement period can be extended for an additional 
five year period. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6) (West 1984). A patent, however, cannot be renewed. 
Thus, when the patent expires, the invention enters the public domain, allowing anyone to use, 
make, or sell products covered by the patent claims. 
 38. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (West 1984). There are a variety of strategic uses for patents. 
Most obviously, the patentee can exploit the patent to attract investments in the development of 
the invention for use in commerce. Likewise, an additional option for a patantee is licensing. 
See generally ALAN S. GUTTERMAN & JACOB N. ERLICH, TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND 
TRANSFER: THE TRANSACTIONAL AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 28 (1997); see also infra note 39 
and accompanying text. 
 39. For example, after an inventor develops a patented technology, she may realize that 
she does not have sufficient funds to produce and market it in commercial quantities. The 
inventor may then choose to enter into a contract in which she gives someone else permission to 
use the patented device for a certain length of time. In return, the inventor receives a set fee and 
royalties derived from the profits generated by the invention’s use. For an extensive discussion 
of licensing, see PORT ET AL., supra note 3. Unpredictability regarding infringement litigation 
affects licensing in two ways. First, there is little reason to obtain a license if a non-patentee 
user does not believe that the use, or modified use, of the device will result in an accusation of 
infringement. Second, if a licensee accepts responsibility for defending against unlawful 
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2. Patent Requirements 
In order for an invention to receive a patent from the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO), the patentee must meet several legal 
standards.40 First, the utility requirement demands that the invention 
be useful at the time the patent is issued.41 Next, the invention must 
be novel with respect to the prior art42 and not obvious to others who 
are “skilled in the art.” 43 Further, the specification44 within the 
 
infringement, the risk of loss to the licensee will increase with the possibility of litigation. 
GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 372 (2d ed. 1994). As such, this will decrease potential income, the 
primary indicator of value, generated by the patent. Id. at 298. This can have a variety of 
effects, all of which are negative for the patentee. The licensee may withdraw from the deal or 
demand that the patentee defend all infringements. Alternatively, the licensee may seek to offset 
this potential risk by paying a lower royalty to the patentee. Thus, the potential resolution of 
infringement issues is intrinsic to the valuation of patented intellectual property. Id. at 31. 
 40. See generally DURHAM, supra note 1, at 61-114 (stating that 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires 
that the patented product or method be new, useful, and non-obvious). 
 41. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (West 1984) (requiring that the patented device have some use 
that is not speculative). Applicants rarely have trouble meeting this requirement. See CHISUM & 
JACOBS, supra note 3, at 12-1; see also Anderson v. Natta, 480 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973) 
(holding that the statute requires no “quantum” of benefit). But see Brenner v. Manson, 383 
U.S. 519 (1966) (illustrating a patent rejection on the grounds of utility). In Brenner, the Court 
refused to uphold a patent for a steroid producing process where there was no disclosed use for 
the steroid. Holding such a patent valid, the court reasoned, would stifle an entire area of 
scientific development with little benefit to the public. Id. at 534-35. Subsequent decisions have 
interpreted Brenner as requiring “substantial utility.” See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (1967). 
This standard may no longer be valid in light of the recent debate regarding the patentability of 
genetic sequences of unknown function discovered during the Human Genome Project. The 
PTO has issued guidance for the utility requirement that would only require the asserted use to 
be “credible.” See 60 C.F.R. 36163 (July 14, 1995).  
 42. “Art” describes all of the patentable intellectual property that passes into the public 
domain after individual patent monopolies expire. See generally MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 
11, at 82-87. 
 43. The non-obviousness requirement may be the most difficult aspect to overcome. 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (1999). The relevant viewpoint is that of a person skilled in the art in question. 
The USPTO and the courts must decide whether someone working in the field could have 
looked at the prior art and come up with the same invention with little or no investment 
meaning that prior art contains all the elements of the invention and teaches a reasonable 
probability that the invention would succeed. See Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer 
Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining the scope of the prior art by the 
inventor’s endeavor); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(obviousness must be determined as of the time of patenting and not with the benefit of 
hindsight); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (stating that “the scope and 
content of the prior art are determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue 
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved). For an 
extensive analysis of the non-obviousness requirement, see NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE 
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inventor’s application must enable the invention’s use and disclose 
the patentee’s best made45 of practicing the invention. Lastly, the 
claims46 within the patent must be definite and represent a full and 
clear disclosure of the invention.47  
3. GMO Patents 
For generations, Congress purported to prohibit the patenting of 
biological organisms.48 A major shift in this policy came in the 1930 
Plant Patent Act, which extended patent-like protection to asexually 
reproducing plants that are discovered in cultivated settings.49 The 
Act aimed to give those involved in agriculture the same 
opportunities as other inventions by providing “a sound basis for 
investing capital in plant breeding and consequently stimulate plant 
 
ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABLITY: PAPERS COMPLIED IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 
SILVER ANNIVERSARY OF 33 U.S.C. § 103 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980), containing many 
papers written by those who were present during the drafting and adoption of the requirement. 
 44. The “specification” is the invention’s description within the patent application that 
allows someone skilled in the art to reproduce the invention, using the patent as a blueprint. See 
MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 10-11.  
 45. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (1999). This requirement seeks to obtain full disclosure from the 
patentee. In other words, the patentee cannot know of two ways to make a product, one better 
than the other, and only choose to disclose the latter in the patent. One can think of this demand 
as a tradeoff for receiving a twenty year monopoly over that which you disclose. See Chemcast 
Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing the best method from the 
perspective of someone skilled in the art by setting out a two-part test to determine the 
inventor’s subjective knowledge of the best method along with an objective inquiry on the 
adequacy of the disclosure). 
 46. “Claims” are the patentable features of the patent or process that distinguish the 
invention from the prior art. See MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 10. Whereas the 
specification tells someone how to make and use the invention, the claims define the invention 
protected by the patent and what rights are due to the patentee. Id. at 110. 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (West 1984). This requires that the patent draw the boundaries around 
the sphere of ingenuity, which it wishes to claim. The test is “whether those skilled in the art 
would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” 
DURHAM, supra note 1, at 66 (quoting Beachcombers v. Wildwood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 
F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 
F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (invalidating claims to recombinant plasmids and transgenic 
micro-organisms because the specifications did not adequately describe the claimed cDNA).  
 48. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); In re 
Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
Even with these limitations, the PTO issued a patent on a living organism, yeast, to Louis 
Pasteur. Specifically, the patent claimed, “yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an 
article of manufacture.” See Leder & Stewart, supra note 14. 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (West 1984). 
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development through private funds.”50 The resulting protection of 
breeders’ rights allowed for greater research and development, which 
in turn, provided the public with immediate benefits from improved 
plants.51  
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,52 the Supreme Court upheld the first 
explicit GMO utility patent issued in the United States. The Court 
found that a live human-made microbe constituted patentable subject 
matter as either a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within 
the meaning of U.S. patent law.53 It is now generally accepted that 
living, human-made, but non-human in form, organisms are 
patentable subject matter.54 The scope of this entitlement may include 
the organism itself as well as the method or process used to produce 
the organism.55 Subsequent patents have been issued for the first 
transgenic plants, created in the 1980s with the transfer of a bean 
gene into sunflower and tobacco plants.56 Additionally, patents have 
been issued for mammals, including the first transgenic mouse.57  
 
 50. S. REP. NO. 315 (1930), quoted in In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 934 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
 51. In the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, congress extended sui generis protection to 
sexually reproducing plants. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1999).  
 52. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 53. See Charles E. Lipsey & Amy L. Tsui Collins, Patent Infringement in the Field of 
Biotechnology, in UNDERSTANDING BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW: PROTECTION, LICENSING, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES 239 (Gale R. Peterson ed., 1993) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101) 
(“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, of 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may contain a patent 
thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 54. The Court noted, however, that “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant 
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.” Likewise, Einstein could not patent his 
celebrated law that E=mc2 nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries 
are “manifestations of … nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 55. The result is that the claim to an organism includes all of the avenues one may pursue 
to create that organism. “The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally 
occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject 
matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Naturally occurring organisms cannot be patented, 
but can provide a basis for alteration, the product of which will be patentable. See In re Bergy, 
563 F.2d 1031, 1046 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 56. Shain-dow Kung, Introduction: From Hybrid Plants to Transgenic Plants in 
TRANSGENIC PLANTS: VOLUME 1: ENGINEERING AND UTILIZATION 8 (Shain-dow Kung & Ray 
Wu eds., 1993); see, e.g., Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd. Pat. App. Int. 1985). 
 57. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988).  
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B. Infringement: Don’t Tread On Me . . . Or My Patent 
Patent infringement involves the making, using, or selling of any 
patented invention during the term of the patent without the 
patentee’s authorization.58 The patentee may sue anyone whom she 
believes is infringing on the claims of her protected invention.59 
Initially, she will seek a temporary restraining order (TRO) and 
preliminary injunction to prevent the infringing party from practicing 
the invention.60 If the matter proceeds to trial, the court will first 
examine the patent’s claims to determine the scope of its protection.61 
Much of this determination will depend upon the language used in 
 
 58. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (West 1984). Note that there is no intent requirement in the 
statutory definition of infringement, therefore it is not a defense for the infringing party to claim 
that she was unaware that the patent existed. See also Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 
(1853) (stating that “[t]he exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at 
liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions”). Patent infringement is 
not to be confused with patent interference. The latter involves a determination of the priority of 
invention between patentees claiming substantially the same invention. Thus, the parties to an 
interference dispute are both claiming that they are rightly entitled to the protections of the 
patent while a defendant in an infringement action argues that either the patent is invalid, 
unenforceable, or that she has not violated the monopoly it creates. See MAURICE H. 
KLITZMAN, PATENT INTERFERENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE xxiii (1984).  
 59. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (West 1984). The patentee must prove infringement by a 
preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Amistar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1545 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). The defendant will only bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense 
when the plaintiff meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 295. Genentech, Inc. v. Boehringer 
Mannheim, 47 F. Supp. 2d 91, 108 (D. Mass. 1999). Note that the protection afforded by the 
patent only applies within the United States. To secure rights to the invention in other nations, 
the patentee must separately apply for patents in those countries. Brian G. Brunsvold & D. 
Patrick O’Reilley, Intellectual Property Rights—What Are They and How Does A Company 
Secure Them?, SF24 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 359, 362 (2000). 
 60. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (West 1984). TRO and preliminary injunctions are equitable 
decisions that the court may make in order to protect the rights of the parties until the 
substantive issues in the dispute can be determined at trial. Michael E. Melton, “The Real 
Ordinance” (TRO) for Patent Enforcement, 619 PLI/PAT. 371, 377 (2000). Before issuing the 
TRO, the court will balance: (1) the likelihood that the patentee will succeed on the merits of 
the dispute, (2) the prospect of irreparable harm if the accused infringing party to permitted to 
continue production or use, (3) whether justice in light of the hardships faced by each of the 
parties requires that the patentee be granted an injunction, and (4) the effect of the TRO on the 
public interest. E.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 
1988).  
 61. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MAXIM H. WALDBAUM, ACQUIRING AND PROTECTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS § 14.02 (2000). The court will hold a pretrial, in reality, 
exact timing may vary, “Markman hearing” to allow both the patentee and defending party to 
present their interpretations of the claim. After this hearing, the court may either adopt one of 
the proposed constructions or develop one of its own. Id. 
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the patent itself62 and can only be supplemented with expert 
testimony when the language is ambiguous.63 The trier of fact will 
then compare the claims patent to the accused device.64 
When there is an identical match between the patented claims and 
the accused device, the accused party’s device has literally infringed 
on the patent. 65 In the absence of an identical match, the patentee is 
still protected under the principles of non-literal infringement that are 
embodied within the doctrine of equivalents,66 which allows the 
reviewing body to go beyond the literal language of the patent.67 The 
 
 62. It is important to keep in mind that “[p]atent claims are composed solely of words, and 
as such may imperfectly reflect the intent of their draftsperson.” Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A 
Normative and Positive Analysis of the Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 281, 281 (1994) (citing Zechariah Chafee Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, in 
FREEDOM’S PROPHET 35 (Edward D. Re ed., 1981)). Similar to applying contract principles, the 
reviewing body must “temper the strict literal meaning of words by exempting the parties from 
the rigid structure imposed by the traditional doctrine of integration and the parol evidence 
rule” in its interpretation of the claims. Id. at 290. Judge Learned Hand noted that in this 
respect, greater liberties are taken in the interpretation of patents than in other areas of law. See 
LEARNED HAND ON PATENT LAW (Paul H. Blaustein ed., 1983) [hereinafter Blaustein]. Thus, 
the patentee can serve as her own lexicographer, but must provide definitions that differ from 
the ordinary meaning given to terms somewhere in the patent application or within her 
correspondences with the PTO; when she fails to do so, the court will understand the terms to 
mean what they would to someone skilled in the art of the invention. See Genentech, Inc. v. 
Boehringer Mannheim, 989 F. Supp. 359, 363 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 63. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptonic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(predicting that these “instances will rarely, if ever, occur”). Thus, the court is generally limited 
to the claims, specification, and file history established during the application process. See 
Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Science, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 133, 150 (D. Del. 1999). 
 64. Glitzenstein, supra note 62, at 281. But see Pegram, supra note 4, at 769 (claiming 
that the use of juries in patent trials is not on the rise, contrary to the popular belief of the legal 
community, and actually accounts for only three percent of all patent cases). 
 65. See DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.04 (2000); see also Glitzenstein, supra note 62, 
at 282. 
 66. The Supreme Court first established the doctrine of equivalents in Winans v. 
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). In that case, the Court stated that no patent can be granted for a 
mere change in the form of an existing device. “To copy the principle or mode of operation 
described, is an infringement, although such copy should be totally unlike the original in form 
or proportion.” Id. at 342. Absent a patentee’s express intent to restrict her claims, the 
presumption is that she sought to cover as many claims as the prior art would allow. Id at 341. 
An inventor, having the right, would cover and protect the whole invention. Id. 
 67. Judge Hand stated that “after all aids to interpretation have been exhausted, and the 
scope of the claims has been enlarged as far as the words can be stretched, on proper occasions 
courts make them cover more than their meaning will bear.” Royal Typewriter Co. v. 
Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948); see also Graver Tank Co. & 
Manufacturing v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). “[T]o permit imitation of a 
patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of 
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doctrine states that infringement exists when all elements of the 
invention are substantially equivalent to the elements of the accused 
device such that one skilled in the art would know of their 
interchangeability.68 The doctrine does not expand the claims of the 
patent, but rather “expands the right to exclude the ‘equivalents’ of 
what is claimed” to account for minor changes and substitutions.69 
Findings of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, however, 
are exceptions rather than the rule. Thus, the public can rely on the 
language of the claims rather than a prediction of what the courts may 
determine is the equivalent of that language.70  
The doctrine has several limitations to further this goal. For 
example, it cannot broaden the patent monopoly to include prior art. 
The rationale for this restraint is that the prior art is in the public 
 
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.” Id. Without the doctrine of equivalents, “the 
inventor [is] at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form.” Id. The 
doctrine is not to be confused with the determination of equivalence under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) 
in the context of means-plus-functions claims. This is in fact a subset of the literal infringement 
inquiry and asks if the accused performs the function claimed, and if so, whether performed by 
a structure that is identical or equivalent to that disclosed in the patent. DURHAM, supra note 1, 
at 146 (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durland-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 945-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Intellicall, Inc. v. 
Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388–89 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).  
 68. See Mary S. Consalvi, Objective Indica of Equivalence and Nonequivalence, 532 PLI/ 
PAT. 265, 272 (1998); see also Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (explaining that the doctrine forms a “penumbra [of protection] which also must 
be avoided if there is to be no infringement”); Envtl. Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 
1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (ruling that the “essence of the doctrine of equivalents is that it 
permits recovery for infringement where the accused device does not fall within the literal 
scope of the claims and is, therefore, outside their literal scope”); Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 
1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that “[e]ven where there is no literal infringement, 
infringement may still be found under the doctrine of equivalents if the limitation or limitations 
not literally present are by there equivalents”). 
 69. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Goeffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 U.S. 537 (1990). Non-literal infringement serves as a judicially 
created equitable doctrine that prevents the subtle pirating of a patentee’s invention. See Lipsey 
& Collins, supra note 53, at 268. 
 70. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting 
that without such a limitation, “claims will cease to serve their intended purpose [and] 
[c]ompetitors will never know whether their actions infringe a granted patent”); see also Sage 
Products, Inc. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (holding that “as between the patentee who 
had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it 
is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection”). But see Pretty, supra 
note 6, at 260 (concluding that the foreseeability that these cases demand is often impossible to 
obtain, and it is exactly this deficiency that the doctrine of equivalents should be used to 
correct). 
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domain and belongs to everyone.71 This standard requires the 
reviewing body to draw a hypothetical claim that includes both the 
patent and accused device. If prior art lies within the hypothetical 
umbrella of coverage, then there is no infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.72 Generally, where a patent is a major 
departure, the range of equivalents is quite large, but when limited to 
avoid prior art, the scope of the doctrine’s protection is limited.73 The 
second limitation is referred to as prosecution history estoppel, and 
precludes patentees from including claims that were given up in order 
to obtain the patent.74 Thus, the scope of the patent may not include 
anything that will circumvent the limitations that the PTO placed on 
the patent when accepting the patentee’s application.75  
When the court finds that infringement has occurred, either 
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents,76 it will usually issue a 
 
 71. See Lipsey & Collins, supra note 53, at 271. The patentee cannot use the doctrine to 
give herself something that she could not have gotten when she filed her patent application with 
the PTO. See Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684. 
 72. See id. at 684. 
 73. The default in this analysis is that the patent’s actual language leads to a small range 
of equivalents because no one can be sure of what the patentee and the USPTO officer said 
during prosecution. See, e.g., Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc. 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 
(Fed. Cir. 1989).  
 74. This concept is also known as file wrapper estoppel because the file wrapper is the 
entire history of the patent prosecution including the initial application, suggestions made by 
the patent examiner, and replies of the patentee in response to those suggestions. See, e.g., 
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 75. This determination is highly dependant on the “nature and purpose” of the 
amendment, as well as any arguments made during the patent’s prosecution. Id. at 871. They 
“may have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero.” Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Naturally, when the 
patentee makes the amendment for some reason other than avoiding prior art, it is unlikely that 
she will be estopped from using the doctrine of equivalents. Furthermore, if the patentee makes 
an amendment to one element to avoid copying the prior art, but the amendment does not affect 
a second element, the patentee will be able to assert equivalence with respect to the latter. See 
Lipsey & Collins, supra note 53, at 272; see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzokv Kogyo 
Kabushiki, Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 76. Even when infringement has occurred, the infringing party may assert an affirmative 
defense. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(1)–(4) (West 1984). These include claims that: (1) the patent 
issued by the PTO was invalid, (2) the patentee is guilty of misuse for trying to extend the 
patentee beyond the monopoly granted by the PTO, or (3) the patent is unenforceable because 
of inequitable conduct on the part of the patentee during prosecution. The defendant has the 
burden of proving these claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See generally THE 
ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 21-38 (Richard G. 
Schneider ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK]; see also Enzo Biochem, 
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permanent injunction to prevent further damage to the patentee’s 
rights.77 Additionally, the infringing party may be liable to the 
patentee for extensive damages related to any lost profits caused by 
the infringement.78 The collective goal of these remedies is to put the 
patentee in the position she would have been in had the infringement 
never taken place.79 
C. Modern Applications of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The Supreme Court set forth the modern statement of the doctrine 
of equivalents in Graver Tank & Manufacturing, Co., Inc. v. Linde 
Air Products Co.,80 in which it stated that the doctrine applied where 
the accused device “performs the substantially same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the claimed 
invention.81 The “function/way/result” test, however, offered no 
 
Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that a patent is not valid 
when its specifications do not enable the use of “anti-sense” technology, which is, required for 
the use of the invention). 
 77. See THE ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK, supra note 76, at 40. 
 78. See 35 USC § 284 (West 1984). The Patent Act creates a cause of action for 
infringement. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
116 U.S. 184 (1995) (citing Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)). The first step in this process is to actually enjoin the infringing party from using the 
protected property. See 35 USC § 283 (West 1984). See generally ERIC M. DOBRUSIN, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION: PRETRIAL PRACTICE GUIDE 51-52, 87-123 (1996). 
Injunctions are readily granted upon a clear showing that the accused device is infringing in 
fact. GUTTERMAN & ERLICH, supra note 38, at 30. The patentee is also entitled to damages and 
a permanent injunction for the remaining life of the patent. Id. (citing Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984)).  The 
upper bounds of the possible damages will be the profits lost from the infringement. These may 
be calculated according to sales made by the infringer, price reductions made in response to an 
infringer’s competition, and a loss in sales growth resulting from the patentee being forced to 
raise prices. Id. (citing Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065-68 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)).  At a minimum, the patentee will receive reasonable royalties calculated over the period 
of infringement as adjusted for interest and costs. Id. Treble damages may be available in the 
case of willful infringement. Id. 
 79. GUTTERMAN & ERLICH, supra note 38, at 30. 
 80. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
 81. Id. at 608 (citing Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). Note 
that the proofs of these elements cannot be subsumed in the proofs for literal infringement, 
though the latter may have a bearing on equivalence. See generally Nestier Corp. v. Menasha 
Corp.-Lewisystems Division, 739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 
(1985).  Thus, the trier of fact is left with little more than the advice to read the specifications 
liberally, in accordance with the design of the Constitution and U.S. patent laws. These seek to 
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guidance on how that comparison should be conducted because it 
does not further define the meaning of the test’s linguistic elements.82  
In an attempt to solve this problem, the Court extensively revised 
the test in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.83 The 
Court now advocates a standard of comparison that asks whether a 
person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have known of the 
interchangeability of the features of the patent claim and the accused 
device.84  
When comparing two elements under this standard, the reviewing 
body must examine the circumstances surrounding the purpose and 
function of the claimed element.85 Thus, what constitutes equivalency 
must be  
determined against the context of the patent, prior art, and the 
particular circumstances of the case . . . Consideration must be 
given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in the 
patent, the qualities it has when combined with other 
ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform.86 
Additionally, the trier of fact should give considerable weight to the 
status of the invention. This will allow for a larger realm of 
equivalents where the invention represents a wide variation from the 
prior art.87 All of these determinations are made at the time of the 
 
promote the progress of the useful arts by allowing inventors to retain the use of their own 
creation. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853).  
 82. See Consalvi, supra note 68, at 268; see also Glitzenstein, supra note 62, at 283 
(arguing that this test does not provide a “yard stick” to conduct that comparison).  
 83. 520 U.S. 17 (1996).  
 84. Id. 
 85. Genetech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363, 1371 (D. Del. 
1990) (explaining part of the doctrine of equivalents analysis in a pre-Warner-Jenkinson 
setting). 
 86. Id. 
 87. A pioneering invention is almost completely unrestrained by prior art. See 
Glitzenstein, supra note 62, at 287. A secondary invention is an advancement on some other 
invention that operates as an outside limit on how far one can extend the range of equivalents 
ascribed to the secondary invention. Id.; see also Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 
F.2d 391, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967):  
A pioneer parent which occupies symbolically a six-inch circle will have three inches 
of equivalence if its range is fifty percent. An improvement patent occupying a two-
inch circle has only one inch of equivalence with the same range. Thus with relatively  
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alleged infringement.88 
Warner-Jenkinson also elevates the importance of the all- 
elements test,89 as it requires a court to find equivalence for every 
limitation of the patented device.90 Though the rule requires a finding 
of equivalence somewhere in the accused device, it need not be in a 
corresponding location.91 Furthermore, claimed elements can be 
combined in the accused entity in order to meet the test.92 The all-
elements test is more difficult for the patentee to satisfy than the 
“function/way/results test because the patent will not be able to focus 
on the invention as a whole to draw attention away from specific 
claim limitations that may be absent. This increase in stringency 
represents the Court’s decision to promote predictability and certainty 
in patent law rather than allowing a patentee to correct her patent’s 
deficiencies during litigation.93  
III. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY: 
PREDICAMENT AND PROPOSALS 
The Court’s decision to demand an all-elements analysis is 
indicative of the courts’ and public’s frustration with the doctrine of 
equivalents. Inventors do not have perfect foresight, but still desire 
protection against an infringing party who may make minor 
unforeseeable changes to avoid literal infringement. There is also a 
need, however, to provide sufficient public notice regarding the 
specific intellectual property that is claimed in each patent.94 
 
identical ranges, the scope of the patent provides the pioneer patent with absolutely a 
larger range of equivalence.  
Even a pioneer invention, however, can not be accorded a range of equivalents broader than its 
mode of operation. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 
684 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). 
 88. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37. 
 89. Id. at 29. 
 90. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durland-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 91. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). 
 92. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 93. See Consalvi, supra note 68, at 293. 
 94. “The claim was not intended to be verbally definitive, but to cover the ‘invention’ 
which should, to some extent anyway, be gathered from the disclosure at large.” Claude Neon 
Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 575 (2d Cir. 1929) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/9
p321 note Gorton book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Equitable Equivalents 341 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents does not further either of these purposes. It frustrates a 
competitor’s ability to design around the patent, impedes the 
discovery of ways to gain the advantages of the invention without 
infringing upon it, and forecloses accurate predictions of litigation 
results.95 Thus, individual inventors are less likely to utilize the 
teachings of the patent, and, therefore, the public does not benefit96 
from competitive research and development.97 In order to address 
these issues, the courts must find an application of the test that 
provides sufficient guidance to remedy the current state of affairs in 
which “each case is inevitably a matter of degree”98 and is “bound to 
have an arbitrary color.”99 
 
15 Haw. 343, 14 L.Ed. 77 (1853)). But Judge Hand, however, goes on to say that, “it is plain 
that such latitude violates in theory the underlying principle that the disclosure is open to the 
public save as the claim forbids, and that it is the claim and that alone which measures the 
monopoly.” Id. (citing Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1887)). 
 95. See Matthew C. Phillips, Taking A Step Beyond Maxwell to Tame the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 155, 164, 165 (2000). This debate 
dates back to the origin of the doctrine where the majority focused on applying the broadest 
construction possible, and therefore instructed courts to look at the substance of the invention 
rather than the form that is claimed. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1853). Conversely, 
Justice Campbell’s dissent held that the doctrine contradicts the requirement that a patent 
applicant “particularly specify and point out what he claims as his invention.” Id. at 347 
(Campbell, J dissenting): 
Fullness, clearness, exactness, preciseness, and particularity, in the description of the 
invention, its principle, and of the matter claimed to be invented, will alone fulfill the 
demands of Congress or the wants of the country. Nothing will be more mischievous, 
more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust 
pretensions and vexations demands, more injurious to labor, than a relaxation of these 
wise and salutary requisitions of the act of Congress.  
See also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 615-16 (1950) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that, in appreciation of the complexity of the subject matter and the 
difficulties inherent in determining proper patent claim scope, Congress has given the PTO the 
power to make these decisions). 
 96. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for examples of these benefits. 
 97. See supra note 36. 
 98. Blaustein, supra note 62, at 110. 
 99. Id. 
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A. The Courts Cannot Figure It Out 
The Supreme Court is well aware of the problems associated with 
the doctrine of equivalents, but has chosen not to address them all.100 
In failing to do so, the Court has left jurors, often untrained in 
science, with little guidance to undertake the daunting task of 
comparing highly complex and technical inventions.101 The Court has 
not given the framework any substance that has a meaningful use in 
completing comparison process.102 For example, after retaining the 
all-elements test in Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court declined to 
define the parameters of an element.103  
The Federal Circuit has had a particularly difficult time creating a 
definition for biotechnology patents.104 One solution proposes to 
change the all-elements test to the all-limitation test so the accused 
device does not infringe on the patent if it excludes any one of the 
claim limitations. 105 Other members of the Federal Circuit have noted 
that limitations may partially comprise elements or modify them.106 
Under this approach, an element may refer to a single limitation. It 
 
 100. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27-28 (“Congress can legislate the doctrine of 
equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various arguments [for and against this 
proposal are] best addressed to Congress, not this court.”). Id. at 28. Such a stance is rather 
unusual because the doctrine was judicially created by the Court in equity, not by statute. See 
generally Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent 
Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel In A Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 
J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 499, 506 (1997) (predicting that, because of the lack of 
clarity in the Court’s decisions, liability under the doctrine will be the “main battle ground in 
twenty-first century patent trials”). 
 101. See Lawrence S. Graham, Note, Equitable Equivalents: Biotechnology and the 
Doctrine of Equivalents After Warner Jenkins Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 6 J.L. & 
POL’Y 741, 786-89 (1998).  
 102. See supra note 82. While the Court has purported to reject linguistic tests that offer 
meaning, it has done little more than change the words from “function/way/result” to “all 
elements” and “insubstantial change.” Id. 
 103. See generally Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 17. 
 104. See, e.g., Genentech v. Boehringer Mannheim GmbH, 989 F. Supp. 359 (D. Mass. 
1997) (applying the doctrine of equivalents to gene fragments); Genentech v. Boehringer 
Mannheim GmbH, 47 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D. Mass. 1999) (analyzing patents for compounds to 
dissolve blood clots); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(analyzing accused infringement of anti-sense technology). 
 105. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durland-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 950 (noting that “where a 
part of the claimed invention, that is, a limitation of the claim, is lacking in the accused device 
exactly or equivalently, there is no infringement”). 
 106. Id. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/9
p321 note Gorton book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Equitable Equivalents 343 
 
has also been used, however, to refer to a series of limitations which, 
taken together, make up a component of the claimed invention. 
Finally, Judge Louries has proposed that, with respect to genetically 
engineered elements, the comparison should focus on their structure 
rather than what they do or how they work.107  
B. Neither Can the Scholars 
A brief review of the literature quickly discloses that the problems 
discussed here have received extensive attention within the legal 
community. Scholars, practicing attorneys, and law students have 
tried to aid the courts by devising their own solutions. A consensus 
has yet to emerge, however, as the proposals range from those that 
suggest an approach outside of the patent system to proposals 
creating specific tests for subsets of biotechnology. 
A proposal at one extreme suggests to eliminate patent protection 
for all GMOs.108 Paul Blunt argues that this would do away with any 
confusion resulting from the doctrine of equivalents because there 
would be no monopoly to infringe upon. Furthermore, such a scheme 
would limit some of the ethical and environmental concerns 
associated with GMOs109 because fewer organisms would be 
protected.110 Rather, plants and animals selectively bred for certain 
traits, without genetic modifications, would be given patent 
protection.111 Thus, the manipulation that pre-dated genetic 
engineering would once again become competitive.112 
Another proposal,113 advocated by Laura E. Ewens, aims at 
lowering the incentive to infringe on patented material by decreasing 
the duration that the patents are in force.114 If the monopoly is only 
 
 107. See Genetech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(Lourie, J., concurring). 
 108. See Paul Blunt, Note, Selective Breeding and the Patenting of Living Organisms, 48 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1365, 1374 (1998). 
 109. Id. at 1374, 1377; see also supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. 
 110. Blunt, supra note 108, at 1383-85; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 111. Blunt, supra note 108, at 1387-89. 
 112. Id. at 1389; see also supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. 
 113. Lara E. Ewens, Note, Seed Wars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and the Quest 
for High Yield Seeds, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV 285 (2000). 
 114. Id. at 308. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p321 note Gorton book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
344 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:321 
 
enforceable for ten years, the patentee still has the ability to recoup 
her research and development expenditures. At the same time, 
however, the public would have greater access to the genetic 
information, and therefore, would be less likely to pirate the 
information.115 Such a system is likely to facilitate technology 
transfers with developing nations, as well as others in desperate need 
of farming innovations.116  
Instead of altering the patenting system, Qing Lin encourages an 
extension of the non-obviousness test from patentability to 
biotechnology infringement.117 The first step in this analysis is similar 
to the initial non-obviousness determination for a patent and asks 
whether, in light of prior art, the accused device would have been 
issued a patent by the PTO.118 The second step asks whether the 
accused device is obvious to a person skilled in the field.119 
Difficulties do not arise from the all-element requirement under this 
test because the patented device is never compared to the accused 
device. 
A number of proposals120 call for the complete eradication of the 
doctrine of equivalents in biotechnology patent jurisprudence because 
of the broad patent constructions that the courts have drawn in the 
first step of the infringement analysis.121 Consequently, a test that 
goes beyond protecting against literal infringement not only 
encourages predatory litigation but increases the potential for 
infringement because of the uncertainty of that litigation.122 The 
dissatisfaction with retaining some form of the test stems from the 
requirements of the all-elements rule and its seeming inapplicability 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Qing Lin, A Proposed Test for Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents to Biotechnology 
Inventions: The Non-obviousness Test, 74 WASH. L. REV. 885 (1999). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Graham, supra note 101, at 770; see also Cliff Weston, Chilling of the Corn: 
Agricultural Biotechnology in the Face of U.S. Patent Law and the Cartegena Protocol, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 337 (2000). 
 121. Graham, supra note 101, at 772. 
 122. Id. at 793; see supra note 61 and accompanying text for a description of this process. 
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to biotechnology inventions,123 even though the comparison might be 
more straight forward in other areas.124  
IV. THE RESOLUTION? A SPECIFIC SOLUTION 
A. Inadequacy of Current Proposals 
Neither Congress nor the courts have adopted any of these 
proposals. Each proposal exhibits major flaws that will 
consequentially prevent the progress of technology.125 For example, 
the all-limitations proposal126 would make the application of the test 
manageable yet useless because the comparison of limitations is 
essentially the same inquiry as that used to determine literal 
infringement.127 Furthermore, those that alter the patentability of 
GMOs will either decrease or eliminate the incentive for investing the 
large sums of money necessary to develop transgenic organisms. 
Without the patent monopoly, there may be a lack of infringement, 
but there will also be a societal void from the absence of useful GMO 
products.128 Furthermore, the proposal for patenting selectively bred 
organisms is unworkable because those plants and animals could be 
generated through natural processes such as cross-pollination.129  
Similarly, decreasing the term of a patent will decrease the 
incentive for investment because it would limit the time that 
 
 123. Weston, supra note 120, at 383. 
 124. For example, one may take apart two motors to compare their parts and run both to 
study their function and the means by which they achieve it. The situation is much more 
complex in biotechnology. Consider the transgenic pig whose milk has been engineered to 
contain human blood clotting factor. Depending on the nature of the claims, an element or 
limitation in this invention, may be the foreign DNA, the modified pig gene containing the 
DNA, the pig itself, or the processes by which the pig was created. If the focus is on the gene, 
the infringing party is likely to avoid defeat because she can argue that a number of different 
sequences within the gene could have been modified to achieve the same result. See Weston, 
supra note 120, at 383. Similarly, she may also prove that any number of other genes could 
have received the insertion. 
 125. See supra note 34-39 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 127. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 676 (1992). 
 128. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 129. There is no such problem in the case of a GMO, especially in those instances where 
the foreign DNA is contrasted synthetically or comes from an organism or, at times, from 
another kingdom or phyla. 
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patentees could recoup their research and development costs. At any 
rate, ten years is still a considerable amount of time for a non-
patentee to create infringing devices or processes. The courts would 
still be left with the existing unworkable test for equivalents during 
this period. While the desire to share technology may be compelling, 
mere changes to patent terms will not increase transfers.130 Any 
change would have to be accompanied by a program to work with 
those in need of technology, to help them produce inventions, and use 
them in their specific situations.131  
Likewise, the application of patentability principles does not solve 
the present doctrinal dilemma. The Lin approach asks whether the 
accused device would have been patentable with respect to the non-
obviousness requirement. This contradicts the requirement of 
analyzing the accused device as of the time of infringement and 
recognizes that its patentability is irrelevant.132 It also completely 
disregards the patentee’s expectation that her claims will be protected 
from identical or equivalent matches. 
Finally, even in light of the courts’ frustration with the doctrine of 
equivalents, it is highly unlikely that the test will be abandoned 
altogether. Even the doctrine’s staunch critics concede that it is an 
integral component of patent law because of the impossibility of 
foreseeing all possible equivalents to a given invention’s elements or 
limitations. Additionally, it appears that the doctrine’s elimination 
could only come about with congressional action.133 Congress is 
unlikely to do away with the doctrine of equivalents because of the 
ability it would give puntative infringers to avoid liability by making 
insubstantial changes to the claimed invention. In the absence of 
protection, the resulting uncertainty from non-literal infringement 
will lead to a decrease in investment, as limiting a patent to its exact 
wording will open the door for infringers to make insubstantial but 
permissible changes.134 
 
 130. See generally DRONAMRAJU, supra note 29; Kinderlerer, supra note 29. 
 131. For example, the knowledge needed to grow a vitamin A enriched strain of rice will 
not help to feed the people of a developing nation that lack the resources to exploit the 
technology on a widespread basis. 
 132. See supra note 79. 
 133. See supra note 100. 
 134. See supra note 94. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/9
p321 note Gorton book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Equitable Equivalents 347 
 
B. The Essential Components of A Successful Framework For 
Comparison 
Each of these proposals fail to meet the general goal of increasing 
patent protection to secure reliable incentives for GMO research and 
development.135 To reach this end, the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents must contain a number of elements. First, and most 
importantly, the test must account for characteristics unique to GMOs 
in order to facilitate comparisons between inventions within 
subgroups of biotechnology.136 Second, district court judges must be 
able to apply the test, as most lack science backgrounds, and are even 
less likely to have experience in the specific subject matter of a given 
patent.137 Third, the test should attempt to avoid litigation by allowing 
for predictability in the patent writing process.138 To this end, it must 
put the public on notice and define the scope of the intellectual 
property monopoly created by the patent.139 Fourth, the test should 
encourage more negotiated settlements, as “patent litigations are 
probably some of the most consuming and expensive litigations that 
 
 135. See Mueller, supra note 100, at 515. “Foremost consideration must be given to the 
ultimate goal of maximizing patent strength,” to give the patentee “an optimal competitive 
advantage while withstanding legal challenge for years to come.” Id.  
 136. For example, it is incredibly difficult to break GMOs into comparable elements 
because they often involve genetic modifications, the means of incorporating foreign DNA into 
the organism to be modified, and the modified organism itself. See Mueller, supra note 100, at 
508. The Federal Circuit’s use of technology-specific rules for determining enablement in the 
context of patentability may indicate an openness for technology specific tests in other areas, 
such as infringement. Id. 
 137. The courts have concluded that juries should be treated no differently in patent cases 
than in other trials. See Harmon, supra note 35, at 183 (citing Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. 
Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). There is, however, a marked lack of scientific expertise at the district court 
level as judges are not trained in the field. Pegram, supra note 4, at 788. This problem is 
compounded by the fact that the attorney making the argument often has little experience in the 
hard sciences, as well as the judicial clerks whom often lack backgrounds in science or 
engineering. Id. 
 138. See generally Mueller, supra note 100. 
 139. This can only be accomplished by providing the fact-finder with a clear system of 
comparison that is simplistic enough to follow and review in an objective manner.  
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exist.”140 Finally, uniformity in the test’s application by the district 
courts and in the Federal Circuit is essential. 141  
C. The Pyramid Test 
The framework proposed here for a new application of the 
doctrine of equivalents, the pyramid test,142 attempts to address each 
of these concerns. Rather than forcing the court to complete the 
nearly impossible task of defining elements within the context of a 
GMO, the test guides the trier of fact to search for equivalents to the 
claims in the accused device at successively increasing levels of 
complexity. Consider an example where the patent claims an 
organism with characteristic x and an accused infringer creates an 
organism that may have the equivalent to characteristic x. First, the 
processes by which the DNA fragment or gene is created or isolated 
are evaluated. This is followed by an assessment of the genetic code 
itself and the mode by which it is inserted into the foreign organism. 
The trier of fact will then compare the mechanism by which the 
transcription is induced and the protein encoded for by the DNA. 
Finally, the protein’s effect on the overall function of the organism or 
 
 140. CHISUM & WALDBAUM, supra note 61, at § 14.02. There is a risk in accusing a party 
of infringement because it gives them a right to seek declaratory judgment against the patent 
holder. Id. Thus, the patentee should investigate the alleged infringing activities, record her 
findings, and take action based on them. Id. (citing Lucasey Mfg. Corp. v. Anchor Pad Int’l 
Inc., 698 F. Supp. 190 (N. D. Cal. 1988)). This should also shield the patentee from damages 
awarded for making bad faith infringement claims. Id. (citing Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres 
Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). It is interesting to note that in light of the great 
technological strides made in the United States, the U.S. legal system may not be that far ahead 
of where it was a century ago. As early as 1908, at least ten percent of the federal court 
system’s time was devoted to patent litigation. VAUGHAN, supra note 34, at 180 (citing Prindle, 
The American Patent System, in 1 AM. INDUSTRIES 20 (1908)). In fact, about one million 
dollars was spent to protect Thomas A. Edison’s incandcesant lamp. Id. at 181 (citing W. 
Kaempffert, Our Defective Patent System, in THE OUTLOOK (July 6, 1912)). Vaughan critiques 
the pre-Graver Tank doctrine of equivalents test for encouraging litigation just as many scholars 
and practitioners do today with the Warner Jenkins test. Furthermore, Vaughan not only points 
out the lack of predictability with respect to infringement, but argues that the expanding 
doctrine gives a patentee an incentive to try to stretch the umbrella of her claims over the use of 
others and engage in predatory litigation. Id. at 188-89.  
 141. One of the primary purposes of the circuit is to create uniformity in the district courts. 
See generally Patlex Corp. v. Mossingkoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 142. See Figure 1. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol9/iss1/9
p321 note Gorton book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Equitable Equivalents 349 
 
the products generated by the GMO will be compared. The 
presumption is that as one progresses from the simplest component of 
the patent toward the products derived from the GMO, the range of 
equivalents will decrease; there are many DNA fragments that may 
code for the same protein, but few proteins that will produce the 
desired effect in the GMO.143 If each level of the accused organism 
matches the patented invention, either literally or as an equivalent, 
then the accused party is guilty of infringement.144  
D. The Pyramid Test Meets the Requirements of a Successful 
Framework 
The pyramid test thus accounts for the difficulties in defining 
elements in genetically modified organisms by allowing for a 
comparison of each level necessary for creation, in connection with 
the organism as a whole. By focusing on each level of complexity, 
this approach does not allow the patentee to draw attention away 
from the absence of similarities that are crucial to the patent. The test 
does not, however, analyze each element in a vacuum apart from its 
effect on the invention as a whole.145 The test is readily applicable by 
both lay judges and jurors, because it directs the comparison along 
the logical process that must be followed during the creation of a 
GMO rather than focusing on abstract elements.146 This analysis also 
provides a methodical level of predictability that patentees can use in 
the application process. The inventor can list each of the steps in the 
GMO production and sufficiently describe those steps to protect her 
rights rather than having to anticipate what the trier of fact will 
actually compare.147 This decreases the problems associated with a 
lack of foreseeability because the patentee can anticipate other ways 
that each step can be achieved, and thus, can directly state them in the 
 
 143. See supra note 24. 
 144. See Figure 1. 
 145. See Pretty, supra note 6, at 285-86. 
 146. The jury should also hear expert testimony to provide background for the evaluation. 
“Without such testimony, a jury ‘is more or less put to sea without guiding charts when called 
upon to determine infringement under the doctrine.’” Glitzenstein, supra note 62, at 300-01 
(quoting Lear Sigler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 147. See supra notes 68-69. 
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application. Accused GMOs falling within those claims will literally 
infringe upon the patent and further decrease the need for the court to 
resort to the doctrine of equivalents.148 These effects, during both the 
litigation and application stages, will put the public on notice 
regarding the exact scope of protection afforded by the patent, and 
will thereby allow competitors to design around the invention without 
infringing upon the patent.149 When infringement does occur, 
however, the parties will be more likely to settle before entering into 
litigation because they will be able to readily predict the outcome of 
that litigation.150 
The pyramid test’s benefits are only obtainable if it is uniformly 
applied in patent litigation. To guarantee its use, the test should be 
adopted by Congress where a substantial legislative inquiry can be 
conducted to generate extensive guidance documents for the 
courts.151 Should Congress choose not to act, either the Supreme 
Court or Federal Circuits should adopt the test and provide a clear 
explanation of its general applicability as well as any possible dicta 
for other categories of GMOs not before the court. 
V. CONCLUSION: ANYONE FOR DESSERT? 
The application of doctrine of equivalents must be reformed so 
that it may be used efficiently and equitably in GMO infringement 
litigation. By connecting the comparison of invention subparts to the 
organism as a whole, the pyramid approach provides the courts with 
suitable guidance to apply the doctrine of equivalents and to provide 
predictability for patentees and the public regarding the results of that 
application. This combination will encourage the level of investment 
in research that is essential to the development of genetically 
modified organisms, which will benefit humanity by improving 
health and protecting the environment. While some of these effects 
 
 148. See supra note 65. 
 149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 141. 
 151. This would require Congress to do more than merely focusing on issues related to the 
appropriateness of GMOs within the context of modern society. See supra notes 25-33 and 
accompanying text. 
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may be disputed, the entry of GMOs into our competitive economy is 
not doubted, thus it is time for patent infringement jurisprudence to 
address these innovations. 
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